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An Exceptional Crisis or an Indication of Widespread Malaise? 
The massive protests that exploded in Chile in October 2019 have left the country reeling from 
shock. The extensive participation of the population in demonstrations in Santiago and in al 
regional capitals, as wel as the exceptional degree of violence and destruction that accompanied 
them, prompted President Piñera to declare a state of emergency that lasted for nine days, put the 
military on the streets and imposed a curfew. This has left many international observers wondering 
what went wrong in a country that has often been held up by mainstream opinion as the poster 
child to other Latin America countries. Relatively high growth rates have been accompanied by 
sharp declines in poverty, steady improvements in educational outcomes, and even recent declines 
in inequality1 – al in the context of a relatively high-functioning democracy. The question emerges 
whether these protests are an exceptional occurence limited to the context of Chile, or whether 
they are an indication of a more widespread malaise in one of the world’s most unequal regions. 
In this article, we argue that the eruption of the social protests observed since October 2019 
should not have surprised any close observer of Chile; in fact, they are paraleled by other protests 
in the region, such as in Ecuador, Colombia and Bolivia. However, the degree of violence, looting 
and incendiary atacks on metro stations, supermarkets, pharmacies and other businesses were 
indeed unexpected, as was the extent of human rights violations resulting from the response of the 
police and armed forces to the disturbances. 
 
 
From Evading the Metro Fare to a Constitutional Debate: The Events as they 
Unfolded 
On 4 October 2019, the Chilean government announced a slight increase in metro fares. Rather 
unexpectedly, high school students spontaneously began to protest, took over metro stations, 
confronted the police and caled for people to avoid paying the fares. On October 18, protests 
suddenly escalated. Hooligans joined in and violence spread. Approximately half of Santiago’s 
metro stations were under siege and damaged. Twenty were set on fire and completely burned out. 
The violence spread to the streets where hooligans vandalised or looted supermarkets, pharmacies, 
banks and other businesses while further damaging public infrastructure. The chaos prompted the 
government to close down the entire metro system, leaving passengers stranded and forcing them 
to spend hours walking home. The folowing day, shocked by the scale of the destruction, President 
 
1 Inequality as measured by household surveys in Chile has declined during the last decade. Initial studies 
using tax data, however, show that it has not (Flores et al., 2019). 
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Piñera declared a state of emergency and imposed a curfew, first in Santiago and then in many 
other cities across the country. The military was ordered into the streets to restore order. Scenes 
strongly reminiscent of the Pinochet dictatorship, which had ruled Chile between 1973 and 1989, 
shocked Chileans and foreign observers alike. Hours later, President Piñera stated that the nation 
“was at war against a powerful enemy, who is wiling to use violence without limits”. Now, in 
January 2020, we stil do not know who that powerful enemy is supposed to be. There is no clear 
evidence on how such a coordinated level of extreme and widespread violence erupted in Santiago. 
No significant arrests have been made by the police, nor has any coherent evidence or explanation 
been put forward by state prosecutors. 
Overwhelmed by the scale the disturbances, the Chilean police have been wholy inept in 
investigating the perpetrators of the widespread violence and destruction. And they have been 
brutal in their methods to contain or suppress the demonstrations, which have generaly been 
peaceful. Police repression has left 3 442 people seriously injured (including 254 children) and has 
led to 1 500 cases of human rights violations, acording to reports by the National Institute of 
Human Rights (2020). Of the total injuries, 1 974 were caused by bulets or rubber bulets, leading 
to 347 eye injuries. These figures have been confirmed by Amnesty International, Human Rights 
Watch, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the United Nations Human Rights 
Ofice of the High Commissioner. 
Immediately folowing the October protests, President Piñera had announced a “New Social 
Agenda”, which commited to establishing a basic minimum income of 350 000 pesos (USD451),2 
increasing basic pensions, expanding the coverage of national healthcare, increasing taxes for high 
income earners, reducing the salaries of the members of Congress and other top public oficials, 
imposing term limits on elected oficials and stabilising the tarifs of public utilities. 
In spite of these measures, however, protests continued, culminating in a massive 
demonstration on October 27, when an estimated 1.2 milion people converged in the centre of 
Santiago while hundreds of thousands gathered in other major cities across the country. Discontent 
with the state of emergency and police aggression, cals for the resignation of the President and 
general disgruntlement with the multiple inequalities that characterise life in Chile motivated 
protesters, who during November staged a national strike folowing cals from the country’s main 
union organisations. The national strike again escalated violence and was countered with continued 
police repression, which led to veritable street batles. This time, however, the government 
refrained from declaring another state of emergency and curfew. 
Instead, President Piñera, supported by new ministers in his cabinet, announced that parties 
from across the political spectrum had negotiated a national agreement for peace – the Acuerdo Por 
la Paz Social y la Nueva Constitución. This agreement proposed a plebiscite in April 2020 during which 
voters would be able to vote on whether they want a new constitution for Chile, and, if so, which 
form the Constituent Assembly would take.3 
Although the response of the Piñera government to the curent crisis has been slow and often 
inept, a cabinet change instituted shortly after the protests erupted brought several key new 
ministers into the government, in particular Gonzalo Blumel (Ministry of the Interior), Karla 
Rubilar (Government Spokesperson), Ignacio Briones (Treasury) and María José Zaldívar 
(Employment and Pensions). These four ministers are from a younger generation and are 
 
2 Calculated using an exchange rate of CLP776 to USD1. The curency code for Chilean pesos is CLP. 
3 The options to be included in the referendum are a Constituent Assembly consisting of representatives 
elected specificaly for the purpose of drafting a new constitution, or a “mixed” Constituent Convention to 
be composed of existing members of Congress and newly elected representatives in equal proportions. 
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associated with the liberal-centre of the political spectrum. They have brought new ideas into play 
and have proposed the first structural policy reforms that are designed to address the underlying 
causes of the crisis. These include a minimum income reform, pension reform and the above-
mentioned social pact that was negotiated to establish a new constitutional process that wil be 
charged with writing a new constitution. Overal, such a wilingness to implement structural 
changes is unprecedented among the centre-right, which systematicaly blocked such reform 
proposals during the last thirty years, most recently during the second government of former 
President Michele Bachelet.  
However, citizen discontent in Chile appears to go beyond any single issue. As the many 
posters and signs displayed by protesters at the demonstrations express, people are tired of a 
development model that perpetuates the country’s deeply rooted inequalities and condemns lower 
income groups to an undignified standard of living, as wel as to unequal treatment by both public 
and private institutions. Political elites are seen as an impenetrable and isolated class with litle 
understanding of the everyday lives of average Chileans. Overal, it seems clear that people’s 
expectations for an improved standard of living have clearly outpaced the results that Chile’s 
political establishment and its development model have been able to deliver. 
 
 
Discontent with the Multiple Dimensions of Inequality 
Chile is one of the most unequal countries in an unequal region in terms of its income inequality. 
And even though this inequality has improved in recent years, it remains high. Data from Chile’s 
household survey shows that only households in the top income quintile are relatively secure and 
are not at risk of faling into poverty in an employment- or health-related crisis (Prieto, 2020).  
However, Chileans feel the prevailing inequality and vulnerability not just when it comes to 
their incomes. Most people in the top income quintile, for example, have private health insurance, 
which provides a first-rate service in first-rate clinics. However, approximately 85 per cent of the 
population relies on the public health system, which provides noticeably slower and poor-quality 
service in generaly run-down public hospitals. Waiting lists for appointments with specialists take 
an average of 302 days, surgical interventions 381 days and medical procedures 562 days. Among 
low-income households, canvassed in Chile’s 2017 national household survey, only 20 per cent of 
people surveyed believe they have a chance of receiving timely atention from the public health 
care system if they were to sufer a catastrophic ilness (Kruger and Barozet, 2019). This leads many 
patients to turn to private clinics, where they prefer to pay for services rather than sufer long 
waiting lists. However, this often means incurring significant levels of debt. 
Education in Chile, while having improved substantialy in recent years, is also largely privately 
financed, while higher education (technical or university) is often entirely debt-financed in poorer 
households. Although the educational reform undertaken by former President Michele Bachelet 
in 2015 wil significantly change this structure over time, the efects of these reforms are not yet 
felt by the population. 
Another important dimension of inequality is the pension system, which is based on highly 
precarious employment conditions. Many workers do not trust the private pension system and 
avoid contributing to it whenever they can, or they contribute only minimal amounts. In 2017, 30 
per cent of workers did not contribute to a pension system at al. Others simply do not have stable 
jobs and therefore do not contribute suficient funds. For example, 30 per cent of formal 
employees have short-term contracts, which last only ten months on average, creating a sense of 
permanent instability and insecurity for workers (Madero-Cabib et al., 2019; Sehnbruch, Caranza 
and Prieto, 2019). In addition, pension contributions at 7 per cent are simply not high enough, and 
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are further reduced by the hefty fees charged by the pension administrators, who book significant 
profits every year irrespective of the performance of the funds. 
It is therefore not surprising that Chileans state that their top three priority concerns are 
pensions (65 per cent), health care (46 per cent) and education (38 per cent). Perhaps the most 
astonishing statistic is that 31 per cent of the population has participated in informal, local protests 
at least once, while 27 per cent have participated in at least one formal, organised demonstration 
(Centro de Estudios Publicos, 2019). 
 
 
The Role of Trade Unions and other Civil Society Organisations during the 
Political Crisis 
The political and social crisis found the country’s trade union movement in disarray. During the 
military dictatorship in the 1970s and 1980s, Chilean unions were decimated both in terms of their 
actual numbers and coverage as wel as their ability to undertake union actions. In addition, labour 
reforms that facilitated hiring on a short-term or subcontracted basis flexibilised the labour market 
to the detriment of unions, weakening their role as a social actor. In one of the country’s most 
unionised export sectors, mining, this process was particularly evident and has created 
segmentation between permanent staf and outsourced workers. The introduction of the 
government’s Labour Plan in 1979 further weakened organised labour. It significantly restricted 
colective bargaining, made it easier to replace striking workers and increased firms’ ability to fire 
workers. Importantly, workers in the public sector were bared from striking. Finaly, the benefits 
of union membership and colective bargaining were no longer extended to the entire workforce, 
which lowered the incentive to organise. 
The impact of the military regime and the introduction of the Labour Plan on the trade union 
movement is reflected by a significant drop in strikes, decreased average size of unions and a 
unionisation rate that declined from 33.7 per cent in 1973 to 11.4 per cent in 1989 (Posner, 2017: 
29). After the return to civilian rule in 1990, unions did not recover their political strength as a 
social actor (Sehnbruch, 2014). In part, this was due to the co-optation of the unions by the 
governing coalition, and the reigning consensus on the need to moderate social mobilisation in 
order to secure the consolidation of democracy. Extant unions thus remain weak; 53.5 per cent of 
unions have fewer than forty members and survive less than two years (Fundación Sol, 2016: 7). 
The social and political crisis that started on 18 October 2019 led unions to colaborate with 
other civil society organisations. The central trade union organisation, the Central Unitaria de 
Trabajadores (CUT), was part of a first efort to organise a social dialogue – the Mesa de Unidad 
Social, which subsequently incorporated more than 150 NGOs and other civil organisations. 
Among them are various trade union confederations, the Teachers’ Union, high school and 
university student federations, organisations representing the right to housing, and organisations 
representing Mapuche Indians and people on the gender spectrum. Since the start of the crisis, the 
Mesa de Unidad Social has organised many local citizen dialogues (cabildos) and compiled a number 
of reform proposals. However, it rejects the national agreement for peace that was negotiated to 
pave the way for establishing a new constitution as it was not consulted during the negotiation of 
this parliamentary pact. Its critical approach to the national agreement has delegitimised the 
political parties that signed the accord. 
Two exceptions in this process are the Communist Party and the Humanist Party, both of 
which have important leaders in the Mesa de Unidad Social and thus reject the parliamentary 
agreement for a plebiscite. However, surveys of participants in the recent demonstrations show 
that the protesters are not necessarily members of a trade union or linked in any other way to the 
 Global Labour Journal, 2020, 11(1), Page 56 
 
Mesa de Unidad Social (NUDESOC, 2019). If anything, what distinguishes the recent protests is their 
inorganic nature. Overal, no clear leadership has emerged from the protesters nor from the civil 
society organisations that make up the Mesa de Unidad Social nor from the entire spectrum of 
political parties. 
 
 
Conclusions 
One important consequence of this difuse and fragmented process is that the parliamentary 
agreement to change the constitution – something unthinkable only a few months ago – may not 
be able to assuage the endemic disgruntlement of the Chilean population by restoring its faith in 
the country’s institutions. This is because the current crisis has developed in the context of a long-
standing and persistent decline of political and institutional legitimacy, which has afected al 
political institutions: government, Congress, the judiciary and political parties (UNDP, 2020). In a 
recent survey, only 3 per cent of the population stated that they trusted political parties and 2 per 
cent that they trusted Congress (Centro de Estudios Públicos, 2020). An evident risk resulting from 
such low levels of trust and institutional delegitimisation, combined with high levels of inequality, 
is that cals for a populist “strong leader” may emerge (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017; Sprong 
et al., 2019; Velasco and Brieba, 2019). 
Despite this rather bleak outlook, some rays of hope shine through. First among them is the 
fact that 64 per cent of Chileans stil believe that democracy is preferable to any other form of 
government, a proportion that has increased slightly since 2008. Second, despite the Mesa de Unidad 
Social’s criticisms and delegitimisation of the parliamentary pact for a new constitution, 67 per cent 
of the population supports the idea of writing a new constitution; 44 per cent would prefer a 
constituent assembly to be elected specificaly for this purpose while 37 per cent believe that a 
constituent assembly should consist of a mix of existing representatives and newly elected 
members. Of the population, 56 per cent believe that a that a new constitution wil help to resolve 
existing tensions, which in turn shows that the criticisms of the Mesa de Unidad Social do not 
represent a majority view (Centro de Estudios Públicos, 2020). In a general context of political 
fragmentation and uncertainty combined with a lack of institutional legitimacy, it is thus remarkable 
that Chileans overal have faith in an institutional solution to this crisis. 
Overal, the ongoing social protests have revealed some inconvenient truths about Chile. At 
the heart of the issue lies an economic development model that has run out of steam in terms of 
its potential for generating sustained and sustainable high growth, a social protection system that 
never transitioned to a fuly-fledged welfare state, a political elite that lacks trust and legitimacy, 
and a subsidiary state with limited capacity to respond to social demands. These are characteristics 
shared by many other countries in the region, regardless of the specific issues that have triggered 
social protests in, for example, Ecuador, Bolivia or Colombia. Latin American historians wil point 
to the number of times that individual countries in the region have hovered on the cusp of closing 
development gaps only to be puled back into social conflict by the discontent bred of endemic 
historical inequalities. If Chile can push through this crisis by means of democraticaly negotiated 
institutional solutions combined with structural reforms that genuinely improve existing 
inequalities, it may yet show other countries in the region a way forward. 
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